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AN EXISTENCE RESULT
ON PARTITIONING OF A MEASURABLE SPACE:
PARETO OPTIMALITY AND CORE
Nobusumi Sagara
This paper investigates the problem of optimal partitioning of a measurable space among
a finite number of individuals. We demonstrate the sufficient conditions for the existence of
weakly Pareto optimal partitions and for the equivalence between weak Pareto optimality
and Pareto optimality. We demonstrate that every weakly Pareto optimal partition is a
solution to the problem of maximizing a weighted sum of individual utilities. We also
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of core partitions with non-transferable and
transferable utility.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the problem of optimal partitioning of a measurable space
among a finite number of individuals. Unlike previous works such as Barbanel and
Zwicker [1], and Dubins and Spanier [3] who imposed additivity on preferences of
each individual, we assume that preferences on a σ-field of individual i are repre-
sented by a continuous transformation of a measure with the form of a nonadditive
set function ui defined by ui(Ai) = fi(µi(Ai)), where µi is a nonatomic finite mea-
sure of a measurable space, Ai is a measurable set and fi is a continuous function
on the range of µi.
We first demonstrate that if fi is continuous for each i, then weakly Pareto optimal
partitions exist; if fi is concave for each i, then a partition is weakly Pareto optimal
if and only if it is a solution to the maximization problem of a weighted sum of
individual utilities for some weight vector; if fi is continuous and strictly increasing,
and each µi is absolutely continuous with respect to each other, then weak Pareto
optimality is equivalent to Pareto optimality.
Next we introduce the concept of a cooperative game in the partitioning of a
measurable space. We demonstrate that if fi is continuous and quasi-concave for each
i, then core partitions with non-transferable utility (NTU) exist; if fi is continuous
and concave for each i, then core partitions with transferable utility (TU) exist.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
Let µ1, . . . , µn be finite measures of a σ-field F of Ω. A partition of Ω is an n-tuple
of disjoint elements of F whose union is Ω. We denote the set of partitions of Ω by
Pn. The image of the n-dimensional vector-valued measure (µ1, . . . , µn) under Pn
is given by
M = {(µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An)) ∈ Rn | (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Pn}.
Define the set of weakly efficient points of M by
Mw = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈M |6 ∃ (b1, . . . , bn) ∈M : ai < bi ∀ i = 1, . . . , n}
and the set of efficient points of M by
M∗ = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈M |6 ∃ (b1, . . . , bn) ∈M : ai ≤ bi ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
and ai < bi ∃ i} .
The following result plays a crucial role in the existence argument in the subse-
quent sections. The proof is found in [5].
Proposition 1. Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic finite measures of a measurable space
(Ω,F). Then it follows:
(i) M is compact and convex in Rn.
(ii) If µi is absolutely continuous with respect to µj for each i and j, then M∗ =
Mw.
3. PARETO OPTIMAL PARTITION
Let fi be a function on the interval [0, µi(Ω)] for i = 1, . . . , n. Denote the finite set
of individuals by I = {1, . . . , n}. Suppose that preferences of each individual on F
are represented by a real-valued set function ui on F of the form ui(A) = fi(µi(A))
for each i ∈ I.
Definition 1. A partition (A1, . . . , An) of Ω is:
(i) Weakly Pareto optimal if there exists no partition (B1, . . . , Bn) such that
ui(Ai) < ui(Bi) for each i ∈ I.
(ii) Pareto optimal if no partition (B1, . . . , Bn) exists such that ui(Ai) ≤ ui(Bi)
for each i ∈ I and ui(Ai) < ui(Bi) for some i ∈ I.
Denote the (n− 1)-dimensional unit simplex by ∆n−1, that is,
∆n−1 =
{
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn |
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
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Theorem 1. Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic finite measures of a measurable space
(Ω,F). Then it follows:
(i) If fi is continuous for each i ∈ I, then there exists a weakly Pareto optimal
partition.
(ii) If fi is concave for each i ∈ I, then a partition is weakly Pareto optimal if and




αiui(Ai) | (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Pn
}
(Pα)
for some α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ ∆n−1.
(iii) If µi is absolutely continuous with respect to µj for each i, j ∈ I and fi is
continuous and strictly increasing for each i ∈ I, then a partition is Pareto
optimal if and only if it is weakly Pareto optimal.
P r o o f . (i) Let fi be continuous for each i ∈ I. Since M is compact by Propo-
sition 1 (i), for any given α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ ∆n−1 the function
∑
i∈I αifi at-
tains a maximum at some point (a1, . . . , an) in M by the continuity of fi. Let
(A1, . . . , An) be a partition satisfying µi(Ai) = ai for each i ∈ I. Then (A1, . . . , An)
solves (Pα). If (A1, . . . , An) is not weakly Pareto optimal, then there exists a par-
tition (B1, . . . , Bn) such that fi(µi(Ai)) < fi(µi(Bi)) for each i ∈ I, which implies∑
i∈I αifi(µi(Ai)) <
∑
i∈I αifi(µi(Bi)), which contradicts the fact that (A1, . . . , An)
solves (Pα). Therefore, (A1, . . . , An) is weakly Pareto optimal.
(ii) Let fi be concave for each i ∈ I. The proof of part (i) demonstrates that if a
partition solves (Pα) for α ∈ ∆n−1, it is weakly Pareto optimal. We shall prove the
converse implication. Let (A1, . . . , An) be a weakly Pareto optimal partition. Define
the utility possibility set by
U = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn | ∃ (a1, . . . , an) ∈M : xi ≤ fi(ai) ∀ i ∈ I}.
Note that U is closed by the compactness of M assured in Proposition 1 (i) and
the continuity of fi, and is convex by the concavity of fi, and the utility vector
(f1(µ1(A1)), . . . , fn(µn(An))) is in the boundary of U by the weak Pareto optimal-





i∈I βifi(µi(Ai)) for any (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ U by virtue of the sup-
porting hyperplane theorem. Since U is unbounded from below, we can derive
βi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I. Normalizing αi = (
∑
i∈I βi)
−1βi for each i ∈ I yields




i∈I αifi(µi(Ai)) for any (x1, . . . , xn) ∈





i∈I αifi(µi(Ai)) for any (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ Pn. Therefore,
(A1, . . . , An) solves (Pα).
(iii) The fact that Pareto optimality implies weak Pareto optimality is evident.
We demonstrate the converse implication. Let (A1, . . . , An) be a weakly Pareto op-
timal partition. Suppose to the contrary that (A1, . . . , An) is not Pareto optimal.
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Then there exists a partition (B1, . . . , Bn) such that fi(µi(Ai)) ≤ fi(µi(Bi)) for
each i ∈ I and fi(µi(Ai)) < fi(µi(Bi)) for some i ∈ I. Hence, (µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An))
does not belong to M∗. The weak Pareto optimality of (A1, . . . , An) implies that
(µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An)) belongs to Mw, and hence it belongs to M∗ by Proposi-
tion 1 (ii), a contradiction. Therefore, (A1, . . . , An) is Pareto optimal. ¤
Remark 1. Theorem 1 contains a generalization of the results with the additivity
hypothesis provided by the literature. Part (i) extends the result of Dubins and
Spanier [3] and part (ii) extends the result of Barbanel and Zwicker [1]. In proving
part (iii) the role of the mutual absolute continuity was recognized by Dubins and
Spanier [3], and Barbanel and Zwicker [1], but it is impossible to find an available
proof in the literature.
4. CORE PARTITION WITH NTU
A nonempty subset of I is called a coalition. We denote the collection of coalitions
by N . Let (Ω1, . . . ,Ωn) ∈ Pn be an initial partition in which individual i ∈ I is





i∈S Ωi for coalition S.
Definition 2. A coalition S improves upon a partition (A1, . . . , An) with NTU if
there exists some S-partition (B1, . . . , Bn) such that ui(Ai) < ui(Bi) for each i ∈ S.
A partition with NTU that cannot be improved upon by any coalition is a core
partition with NTU.
It is obvious from the definitions that a core partition with NTU is weakly Pareto
optimal. Note that if fi is continuous and strictly increasing for each i ∈ I and µi
is mutually absolutely continuous, then a core partition with NTU is also Pareto
optimal by Theorem 1 (iii).
Theorem 2. Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic finite measures of a measurable space
(Ω,F). If fi is continuous and quasi-concave for each i ∈ I, then there exists a core
partition with NTU.
P r o o f . Define the n-person game V : N → 2Rn with NTU by
V (S) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn | ∃ (a1, . . . , an) ∈M : xi ≤ fi(ai) ∀ i ∈ S}.
The core of the n-person game V , denoted by Core(V ), is defined by
Core(V ) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V (I) |6 ∃S ∈ N 6 ∃ y ∈ V (S) : xi < yi ∀ i ∈ S}.
By the compactness of M asserted in Proposition 1 (i) and the continuity of fi, it
follows that V (S) is closed.
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We demonstrate that V is a balanced game. To this end, let B be a balanced




S = 1 for each i ∈ I. Define
χSi =
{





































Choose any (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
⋂
S∈B V (S). Then for each S ∈ B there exists some
(aS1 , . . . , a
S




each i ∈ I. By the convexity of M asserted in Proposition 1 (i), we have (b1, . . . , bn) ∈
M . By the quasi-concavity of fi, we have xi ≤ fi(bi) for each i ∈ I. We thus obtain
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V (I). Therefore,
⋂
S∈B V (S) ⊂ V (I), and consequently V is balanced.
Since the balanced game V obviously satisfies other sufficient conditions guar-
anteeing the nonemptiness of the core of V (see Scarf [7]), we can choose an ele-
ment (x1, . . . , xn) in Core(V ). Then, there exists some (a1, . . . , an) ∈ M such that
xi ≤ fi(ai) for each i ∈ I, and hence there exists a partition (A1, . . . , An) such that
xi ≤ fi(µi(Ai)) for each i ∈ I. Suppose that (A1, . . . , An) is not a core partition.
Then, there exists some S-partition (B1, . . . , Bn) such that fi(µi(Ai)) < fi(µi(Bi))
for each i ∈ S. We then have (f1(µ1(B1)), . . . , fn(µn(Bn))) ∈ V (S) and xi <
fi(µi(Bi)) for each i ∈ S, which contradicts the fact that (x1, . . . , xn) is in Core(V ).
¤
Remark 2. The nonemptiness of core partitions with NTU when the utility func-
tion of each individual is a quasi-concave continuous transformation of a nonatomic
finite measure appears to be a new result. Sagara and Vlach [6] investigated more
general convex continuous preferences to demonstrate the existence of core partitions
with NTU.
5. CORE PARTITION WITH TU
The definition of core partitions is modified in the case of TU as follows:
Definition 3. A coalition S improves upon a partition (A1, . . . , An) with TU if





partition with TU that cannot be improved upon by any coalition is a core partition
with TU.
It is obvious from the definitions that a core partition with TU is weakly Pareto
optimal and that a core partition with TU is a core partition with NTU. Note that
if fi is continuous and strictly increasing for each i ∈ I and µi is mutually absolutely
continuous, then a core partition with TU is also Pareto optimal by Theorem 1 (iii).
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Theorem 3. Let µ1, . . . , µn be nonatomic finite measures of a measurable space
(Ω,F). If fi is continuous and concave for each i ∈ I, then there exists a core
partition with TU.
P r o o f . Let fi be continuous and concave for each i ∈ I. Since fi is bounded
for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant f̄ such that fi − f̄ ≤ 0 for each i ∈ I. Thus,
without loss of generality, we may assume that fi has nonpositive real values for each
i ∈ I by replacing fi with fi − f̄ in Definition 3, if necessary. Define the n-person




fi(ai) | (a1, . . . , an) ∈M
}
.
By the compactness of M asserted in Proposition 1 (i) and the continuity of fi, the
maximum in the above is indeed reached. The core of the n-person game v, denoted
by core(v), is defined by
core(v) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈I
xi ≤ v(I) and v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
xi ∀S ∈ N
}
.
We demonstrate that v is balanced. Let B be a balanced family with balancing
weights {λS ≥ 0 | S ∈ B}, and let Bi and tS be defined as in the proof of Theorem 2.





v(S). Define bi =
∑
S∈B t
SaSi for each i ∈ I. By the convexity of M asserted
in Proposition 1 (i), we have (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ M . By the concavity of fi, we have∑
S∈B t



































where the third and fourth inequalities follow from the nonpositivity of fi, and the
fact that 0 ≤ χSi ≤ 1 and v(S) ≤ fi(aSi ) for each i ∈ I and S ∈ B. Therefore,∑
S∈B λ
Sv(S) ≤∑i∈I fi(bi) ≤ v(I), and hence v is balanced.
Using the celebrated theorem of Bondareva–Shapley (see [2, 8]), there exists some
(x1, . . . , xn) in core(v). We then have
∑
i∈I xi = v(I). By the compactness of
M asserted in Proposition 1 (i) and the continuity of fi, there exists a partition
(A1, . . . , An) such that
∑
i∈I fi(µi(Ai)) = v(I). Suppose that (A1, . . . , An) is not





i∈S fi(µi(Bi)). Since fi(µi(Ai)) ≤ v(i) ≤ xi for each











i∈S fi(µi(Bi)) ≤ v(S), which
contradicts the fact that (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ core(v). ¤
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Remark 3. Theorem 3 is not a contribution, as Legut [4] proved the existence
of core partitions with a TU game when the utility function of each individual is
a concave continuous transformation of a nonatomic finite measure. However, the
proof presented in this paper is somewhat different from that of Legut [4] in that
Lebesgue integrals are not used explicitly in our proof. While the existence result in
our proof crucially depends on the use of Proposition 1, its proof does not require
the Lebesgue integrals (see [5]). For the existence of core partitions with a TU game
with more general convex continuous preferences, see [6].
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